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THE FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP OF ENFORCEMENT 
AND IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS
Stine Andersen*
Summary: This article argues that notwithstanding the doctrinal dis-
tinction between enforcement and implementing measures, there are 
effective points of functional overlap between enforcement powers 
and certain types of implementing tools, which are lawful in that they 
serve other aims and purposes than enforcement. Since the Commis-
sion employs these measures in conjunction with the general infringe-
ment procedure or as an alternative with the less discernible aim of 
ensuring compliance, a comprehensive EC enforcement analysis must 
take note of them. Potential legal constraints on the Commission in 
employing these instruments, such as the proportionality principle, 
are among the questions raised. In addition, the article explores how 
any perceived misuse may have ramifi cations for the Commission’s 
ability to have future implementation powers established in second-
ary law.
Introduction
This article argues that in parallel to the Commission’s formal means 
of monitoring Member States’ compliance with EC law under Article 226 
EC, there are various ‘implementation measures’ that can be employed 
to achieve the same objectives and thus supplement or compensate the 
Commission for its absence of sharper secondary enforcement powers.1 A 
number of examples of such functional overlap between enforcement and 
implementation measures will be examined in order to determine to what 
extent the implementation measures can serve as effective substitutes/
complements to enforcement mechanisms. When evaluating the increas-
ing reliance on implementation measures as a tool to ensure Member 
State compliance with Community law, it should be kept in mind that the 
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EC Treaty does not provide a legal basis for the Council to establish ad 
hoc enforcement procedures in secondary legislation.2 Besides a few ex-
ceptions, notably in relation to Member State budgetary discipline where 
the general infringement procedure is suspended, the Council does not 
normally possess enforcement powers under the fi rst pillar. Furthermore, 
the European Court of Justice (hereinafter the ECJ or the Court) has 
construed a narrow scope for implied powers. Thus, it would be diffi cult 
and indeed unlawful to have decision-making mechanisms coexist with 
the enforcement powers of the Commission and ECJ respectively, if they 
were to imply an authoritative interpretation of Community law or em-
power the Commission to make a binding assessment of Member State 
behaviour and its conformity with Community law. The Council’s lack 
of general enforcement powers in turn precludes it from delegating any 
such authority to the Commission. Thus, Article 7 EC and the principle of 
attributed powers mark an important limitation on the legislator and its 
ability to legitimately confer enforcement powers upon the Commission. 
The Member States clearly do not want a general or ad hoc reinforcement 
of the Commission’s enforcement powers, which would not only change 
the relationship between the Commission and individual non-compliant 
states, but also shift the institutional balance of power within the Com-
munity.
The distinction between implementation and enforcement mer-
its brief clarifi cation. The EC Treaty represents a catalogue of primary 
norms, encompassing the internal and external competences of the re-
gime as well as the powers of the legislative, adjudicative and executive 
branches of government. Within this framework of primary law, the leg-
islator is empowered to articulate substantive rules - secondary law. In 
addition, there are organisational, as well secondary, rules that establish 
the specifi cations required for putting the law into practice. Such second-
ary and tertiary, implementing, norms facilitate the ‘putting into effect 
of legislation, decisions, or policies formulated and agreed by the EU’s 
policy-making institutions’.3 Secondary and tertiary norms are plenti-
ful within the Community and unprecedented in any other international 
law-regime. Enforcement, in contrast, denotes the act of compelling com-
pliance with a legal obligation and only becomes relevant in the phase 
succeeding implementation when the question arises whether a given 
law has been implemented and enforced effectively. According to Article 
2  Stine Andersen, ‘The European Commission’s Quest for Strengthened Powers of En-
forcement -Procedural and Substantive Appraisal of Selected Legislative Proposals’, paper 
presented at the 4th Convention of the Central and East European International Studies 
Association (University of Tartu, Estonia, 25-27 June 2006) <http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/
orb.aw/class=fi le/action=preview/id=164087/andersen.pdf> accessed 21 September 2007 
3  M Cini, ‘Implementation’ in Michelle Cini (ed), European Union Politics (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003) 349. 
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211 EC, the Commission shall supervise Member State compliance with 
Community law. The tools available to it in doing so are stipulated in 
Articles 226 and 228 EC - the general Treaty infringement procedure. 
Article 226 EC, addressing Member State failure to observe Community 
law, consists of a two-stage administrative phase and a judicial phase. 
During those phases the Commission has absolute discretion in deciding 
whether to pursue an infringement and ultimately to refer it to the ECJ. 
The ECJ possesses sole authority to undertake interpretation of Com-
munity law and appraise Member State conduct4 and its judgments are 
declaratory. Article 228 EC concerns failure to comply with a judgment 
of the Court. The procedure is largely similar to Article 226 EC however 
the Commission can request the Court to impose a lump sum or/and a 
penalty payment on the defaulting Member State. 
In the framework outlined above, the notions of enforcement and im-
plementation are distinct and appear to be neither compatible nor inter-
changeable. However, there are cases in which, the Commission rather 
than making use of its implementation powers could have pursued a 
situation as an infringement case under Article 226 EC. As will be ex-
plained in more detail in section III, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
provides an example of a policy area in which, the Commission enjoys 
non-enforcement measures that can effectively be employed in combina-
tion with the Commission’s tools of enforcement. To illustrate, it may 
invoke emergency measures such as establishing a fi shing moratorium 
to forestall imminent risks of fi sh-stock deterioration. The measure is not 
aimed at ensuring compliance and is not an enforcement tools per se. 
However when the formal conditions for taking such action are present, 
the Commission can employ them against a Member State in breach of 
the Treaty and thus utilise the emergency measures in isolation or to-
gether with the general infringement procedure. In the latter case, the 
mere threat of emergency measures can function as a bargaining tool 
in the administrative phase of Article 226 EC. In addition, when emer-
gency measures are invoked, they effectively bring a perceived infraction 
to standstill while infringement proceedings are pending. Other types of 
implementation mechanisms established in secondary law are explicitly 
intended as tools to prevent infringements. The Member States’ obligation 
to notify the Commission about draft technical regulations and the Com-
mission’s corresponding powers to take action are examples thereof. 
The argument proceeds as follows. First, the notion of implemen-
tation within the EC Treaty will be discussed in some detail. Selected 
measures will be grouped and examined under the headings (i) preventive 
4  Article 220 EC.
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measures (ii) safeguard and emergency measures and (iii) conditionality.5 
The closing section concerns issues regarding the application of imple-
mentation measures with the aim of securing Member State compliance. 
Potential legal constraints on the Commission in employing these, such 
as the proportionality principle, are among the questions raised. It is ar-
gued that although the Commission is largely at liberty to employ these 
measures with a functional aim of ensuring compliance, any perceived 
misuse may have ramifi cations on the Commission’s ability to obtain im-
plementation powers when subsequent secondary laws are established. 
At least the Council will be likely to establish Member State oversight 
mechanisms in connection with the delegation of power. 
I. The scope of implementation
Powers to implement Community law rest at the level of the state and 
as well as at the Community level without any defi nite logic of separation. 
Similarly, there is no automatic relationship with the type of competence 
in question.6 The Convention working group on the delimitation of com-
petences between the European Union and the Member States however 
maintains that as a general rule ‘competence to implement and apply leg-
islation in accordance with their respective constitutional rules [...] rests 
with the Member States [...] The Community exercises such competence 
in a subsidiary capacity only’.7 The interpretation is based on a combined 
reading of Articles 10, 202 and 211 EC. 
To the extent that implementation takes place at the supranational 
level, it follows from Article 202, that the Council shall delegate pow-
ers of implementation to the Commission. It may however reserve the 
right to exercise implementing powers in specifi c cases. Notwithstand-
ing the wording of Article 202 EC that clearly suggests an obligation to 
delegate, the Council effectively has an absolute power to reserve the 
right of implementation. That is to say, a Council decision to reserve 
the powers to implement in a specifi c case will not be examined in sub-
stance by the ECJ. However, when quantifying the Community’s main 
source of tertiary binding law, the Commission far outweighs the Council 
in sheer volume.8 Thus delegation is not just the rule in legal terms, but 
also in actual terms. In reserving powers to implement, the Council shall 
5  This enumeration of directives and regulations is not exhaustive.
6  European Convention, ‘Delimitation of competence between the European Union and 
the Member States - Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored’ (Note) CONV 
47/02, 15 May 2002. 
7  Ibid.
8  G Haibach, ‘Separation and Delegation of Legislative Powers: A Comparative Analysis’ in 
Mads Andenas and Alexander Türk (eds), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees 
in the EC (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000).
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demonstrate in depth the grounds for its choice9 and explain its reasons 
for departing from the conventional procedure.10 Therefore, with the ex-
ception of instances where the Commission is explicitly empowered by 
the EC Treaty, there has to be express delegation from the Council. The 
Commission’s corresponding institutional powers to carry out implemen-
tation are stipulated in Article 211 EC: ‘The authorising norm […], the 
delegating norm […] and the norm exercising powers contained in the 
enabling norm (implementing act) form a whole that contains the relevant 
law’.11 Derived legal norms must be within the substantive scope of their 
enabling provision because the institutions cannot act beyond their ex-
plicitly granted powers. This follows from the principle of attributed pow-
ers as well as from the wording of Article 249 EC, which denotes a range 
of instruments available to the institutions ‘in order to carry out their 
task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty’. Jürgen Bast 
notes that the wording articulates ‘a strict hierarchy between (primary) 
Treaty law and (secondary) derived law’ and, he continues, this hierarchy 
of norms is indeed a ‘precondition that makes the principle of attributed 
powers work’.12 
Employing a contextual and essentially pragmatic understanding of 
Article 211 EC, the ECJ has consistently held that the scope for imple-
mentation is to be interpreted in a fairly broad manner.13 On condition 
that it does not lay down measures which confl ict with the delegating 
act, the Commission may thus ‘adopt all the measures which are nec-
essary or appropriate for the implementation of the basic legislation’.14 
Whereas Articles 202 and 211 EC simply use the expression implemen-
tation without specifi cation, it is clear from jurisprudence that the no-
tion of delegated implementation powers encompasses both powers ‘to 
9  Case C-16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457 para 10.
10  Case C-257/01 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-345 para 51.
11  GF Schäfer, Georg Haibach and Alexander Türk, ‘Subproject 3: Policy Implementation 
and Comitology Committees’ (May 2000) EIPA WP 39:4, 47 <http://www.eipa.nl/Publica-
tions/Summaries/2000/chap_4.pdf> accessed on 3 October 2007. 
12  Jürgen Bast, ‘On the Grammar of EU Law: Legal Instruments’ (2003) Jean Monnet WP 
9 p 17. 
13  Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo Adriano Srl/Dilexport Srl v Ministero del 
Commercio con l’Estero (reference for preliminary ruling) [2004] ECR I-6911 para 53. The 
judgment in Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383 para 36 states that 
Articles 202 and 211 EC ‘distinguish between rules which, since they are essential to the 
subject-matter envisaged, must be reserved to the Council’s power, and those which being 
merely of an implementing nature may be delegated to the Commission’. The classifi cation 
‘essential’ is reserved for provisions intended to give concrete shape to the fundamental 
guidelines of Community policy. See para 37 of this same judgment.
14  Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission 
[1997] ECR I-645 para 37.
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adopt generally applicable or individual measures within specifi c areas’.15 
The Treaty itself does not make a distinction between these two types of 
power. It is precisely the lack of restrictions attached to the notion of im-
plementation in the Treaty which led the Court to reject a narrow reading 
of its scope. Implementation can thus be thought of as covering both (i) 
legislative powers and (ii) executive powers. Delegation of legislation is a 
normative power that enables the Commission to establish general rules 
or procedures, for applying the rules laid down by the legislator.16 The 
Commission emphasises the merits of delegating legislative powers from 
the Council to the Commission, particularly in ‘policy sectors with rapid 
technical changes’.17 These rules are, as are Advocate General Darmon 
notes, ‘of a general and impersonal nature’.18 Executive powers enable 
the Commission to put Community law into operation either through the 
adoption of detailed provisions or individual decisions. The same Advo-
cate General denotes the latter as administrative implementation.19 
In considering scope and effect, executive decision-making has man-
ifest similarities with court rulings and such powers appear reminiscent 
of genuine enforcement tools because they enable the Commission to 
make concrete decisions. However, as will be demonstrated in the fol-
lowing section, legislative powers can likewise have areas of functional 
overlap with enforcement measures, in particular when applied with the 
intention of achieving interpretive clarifi cation of ambiguous legal obliga-
tions. 
II. Selected implementation powers
1. Preventive measures
A. Services in the Internal Market 
There are a number of different types of Commission instruments 
established in secondary legislation with purpose of anticipating non-
compliance. In 2004, the Commission tabled a proposal for a framework 
directive on services in the Internal Market. The proposal contained a 
‘general legal framework applicable, subject to certain exceptions, to all 
15  Case C-16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR-3457 para 16 and, in particular, para 
11. 
16  Case C-298/89 Government of Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR I-3605. 
17  EC Commission, ‘Questions and Answers: An Institutional Architecture for the Euro-
pean Union (Peace, Freedom, Solidarity)’ MEMO (2002) 285, 5 December 2002.
18  Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 
II-3457 para 15.
19  Ibid.
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economic activities involving services’.20 This horizontal method was mo-
tivated by the perception that infringements within the Internal Market in 
services are frequently ‘common to a large number of different activities 
and have many features in common’.21 In the pre-legislative and legisla-
tive period concerning the Commission’s proposal, the Commission as 
well as the European Parliament (hereinafter the EP) raised the issue of 
non-compliance. The EP stressed the need for ‘a rigorous infringement 
policy vis-à-vis Member States which take measures incompatible with 
Articles 43 [right of establishment] and 49 [free movement of services] 
of the Treaty’.22 The Commission, for its part, emphasised that obstacles 
to these provisions do persist and that it would be ‘ineffective’ and ‘un-
manageable’ to address them individually under the general infringement 
procedure.23 Section three of the Commission proposal lists Member State 
requirements that are either prohibited or subject to evaluation. Article 
14 concerns Member State requirements to be abolished. To illustrate the 
degree of detail, Article 14(3) contains a prohibition of 
restrictions on the freedom of a provider to choose between a prin-
cipal or a secondary establishment, in particular an obligation on 
the provider to have his principal establishment in their territory, or 
restrictions on the freedom to choose between establishment in the 
form of an agency, branch or subsidiary. 
Article 15 requires Member States to examine whether specifi ed do-
mestic requirements are in conformity with conditions of non-discrimina-
tion, necessity and proportionality. After drawing up a self-assessment, 
all Member States derive a mutual evaluation report and declare if plan-
ning to maintain any requirements as well as their reasons therefore, in 
addition to requirements that have been suspended or amended. The 
procedure thus leaves room for peer review while also facilitating the 
exchange of arguments based upon interpretation, legal principles and 
precedent. The Member States can only introduce new requirements if 
they comply with the conditions of non-discrimination, necessity and 
proportionality mentioned above. As an additional requirement, any such 
domestic obligation shall result from new circumstances.24 Then, 
20  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on services in the internal market’ COM (2004) 2 fi nal/3, preamble 3a). 
21  Ibid, preambular point 3a).
22  European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Commission Communication “An Internal Mar-
ket Strategy for Services”’ (4 October 2001) A5-310/2001.
23  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the recognition of professional qualifi cations’ COM (2004) 02, para 30.
24  EC Commission (n 20) art 15(5).
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[w]ithin a period of 3 months from the date of notifi cation, the Com-
mission shall examine the compatibility of any new requirements 
with Community law and, as the case may be, shall adopt a decision 
requesting the Member State in question to refrain from adopting 
them or to abolish them.25 
Whereas decisions are binding in their entirety upon those to whom 
they are addressed, the Commission is merely empowered to request the 
Member State to refrain from or abolish a requirement. The wording avoids 
the constraints set by the EC Treaty against ad hoc infringement proce-
dures while ascertaining and formalising a Commission soft-law tool to 
address potential or existing infringements. Finally, Article 16 specifi es a 
list of prohibited restrictions. 
In the preamble of the proposal, the Commission explains that the 
requirements enumerated in the directive and Article 226 EC have dif-
ferent aims: 
While the latter concern individual cases resulting from specifi c cir-
cumstances and measures in a particular Member State, the former 
are on the other hand aimed at ensuring, in a general and system-
atic fashion, that the legal systems correspond to the requirements 
of a genuine internal market in services in which, the freedom of 
establishment and free movement of services are facilitated.26 
The proposal for a directive concerning services contains a mecha-
nism that can deal with potential infringements of Community law by 
systematising Commission scrutiny as well as enabling self-assessment 
and multilateral peer review of clearly spelled out obligations. Although 
the procedure attributes a central function to the Commission, it is fairly 
decentralised in the way it functions. In comparison with the general in-
fringement procedure, this Internal Market procedure displays apparent 
gains in terms of economies-of-scale, both when measured up to infor-
mally negotiated agreements reached during the administrative stage, 
and to rulings by the Court which merely remedy specifi c infringement 
incidents.27 The approach seems apt for other policy areas where a sub-
stantial body of jurisprudence indicates that there are clusters of compli-
25  EC Commission (n 20) art 15(6). The proposal was adopted as Directive 2006/123/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the inter-
nal market [2006] OJ L376/36. The provision is now Article 15(7); however, no substantive 
amendments have been made. 
26  EC Commission (n 20) 7f), preamble. 
27  However, in this course of action there will typically be more states involved and in the 
judicial phase all Member States and Community institutions may intervene and submit 
statements of case and of law. See Art 40 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice [2001] OJ C80.
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ance failures applying to a large number of Member States. In addition, 
the Member State interest in ensuring compliance should prevail over 
any interest in room for manoeuvre in the implementation phase.
B. Draft Technical Regulations 
Standardisation makes up an instrument against barriers to free 
movement of goods and services and has been hailed as a central measure 
for the realisation of the Single Market since the fi rst Council Resolution 
from 1985.28 Currently, EC standardisation is largely regulated by Direc-
tive 98/3429 and a number of sector specifi c regulations. Harmonisation of 
technical standards and regulations are frequently accompanied by pre-
ventive clauses. Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying 
down a procedure for the provision of information in the fi eld of technical 
standards and regulations is illustrative of this.30 In its Communication 
from 1993 on the handling of urgent situations in the context of imple-
mentation of Community rules, the Commission discusses the notion of 
technical harmonisation measures and its institutional powers:31 
[T]he Commission must ensure that the directive has been properly 
implemented […] It acts under the competences conferred on it by 
Article 155 [now 211]. Safeguard clauses give the Commission pow-
ers of enquiry; these are, however, limited since they are not powers 
of investigation but involve consultation of the interested parties. […] 
Once consultations are completed, the Commission must draw up a 
report as to whether the measure is justifi ed. 
28  Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards [1985] OJ C136/1 and Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on the role of 
standardisation in Europe [2000] OJ C141/5. 
29  Directive 98/34 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the fi elds of technical standards and regulations and of 
rules on information services [1998] OJ L204/37, amended by Directive 98/48 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council [1998] OJ L217 art 8 and 9. Directive 98/34/EC now 
applies to all industrial, agricultural and fi shery products as well as Information Society 
services. EC Commission, ‘The Operation of Directive 98/34/EC from 2002-2005’ (Com-
mission Staff Working Document) COM (2007) 125 fi nal.
30  Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provi-
sion of information in the fi eld of technical standards and regulations [1983] OJ L109/8, 
as amended by Directive 88/182/EC [1988] OJ L81/75, Directive 94/10/EC [1994] OJ 
L100/30 and Directive 98/34/EC [1998] OJ L204/37. For a comprehensive analysis of 
Directive 83/189 and subsequent directives on compulsory notifi cation of draft technical 
regulations, see Stephen Weatherill, ‘Compulsory Notifi cation of Draft Technical Regula-
tions: The Contribution of Directive 83/189 to the Management of the Internal Market’ 
(1996) 16 YEL 129.
31  EC Commission, ‘Communication on the handling of urgent situations in the context 
of implementation of Community rules - Follow-up to the Sutherland report’ COM (1993) 
430, 40ff.
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According to the original Council Directive 83/189/EEC, the Mem-
ber States are obliged to announce to the Commission draft technical 
regulations and submit a justifi cation for their introduction. The Com-
mission informs the other Member States and can further refer the draft 
to a Committee for its opinion. The Member States and the Commission 
are given the chance to make remarks and the Member State must take 
these into account in the subsequent preparation of the technical regula-
tion. Upon Member State or Commission requests, the fi nal text must be 
provided to the supplicant. The Member States shall suspend the draft 
for six months from the date of the notifi cation if the Commission or 
another Member State presents a comprehensive opinion within three 
months of that date. The Commission may decide to propose or adopt a 
directive in response to the notifi cation. In that case, the standstill period 
is prolonged to 12 months.32 The Directive enables the Commission to 
forewarn a Member State of cases ‘where draft technical regulations, if 
adopted, would run counter to Community law’33 and, the Commission 
contends, enables the other Member States ‘to play an important role in 
preventing the creation of new technical barriers to trade’.34 The mecha-
nism constitutes a key instrument in ensuring the proper functioning 
of the Internal Market by making it possible for the Commission to ‘to 
identify possible barriers to trade before they enter into force and thus to 
avoid the need to initiate many infringement procedures’.35 
The obligation to notify the Commission of draft technical regula-
tions is however no guarantee of compliance and demands monitoring in 
itself. Thus the Commission initiated procedures under Article 226 EC 
more than hundred times during the period between 1995 and 1998 in 
cases where the Member States had failed to notify draft measures or to 
adopt them before the end of the standstill period.36 In a judgment from 
1996, the Court ruled on Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 83/189/EEC,37 
now Directive 98/34/EC,38 stating that individuals may rely on them be-
fore national courts and, notably, that the national courts shall refuse to 
apply a national technical regulation unless it has been notifi ed in line 
32  Council Directive 83/189/EEC (n 30) art 8 and 9.
33  Ibid.
34  EC Commission, ‘Communication concerning the non-respect of certain provisions of 
Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision 
of information in the fi eld of technical standards and regulations’ [1986] OJ C245/4.
35  EC Commission, ‘Better monitoring of the application of Community law’ (Communica-
tion) COM (2002) 725.
36  EC Commission, ‘The operation of Directive 98/34/EC from 1995 to 1998’ (Report to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee) COM (2000) 
429.
37  Council Directive 83/189/EEC (n 30) 8-12.
38  Directive 98/34/EC (n 30) 37-48.
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with the directive. Accordingly, breach of the obligation to notify renders 
the technical regulations concerned inapplicable and consequently un-
enforceable against individuals.39 The legal justifi cation for this is based 
on the obligation to inform the Commission about draft legislation. The 
obligation is, the Court ascertains, unconditional and suffi ciently precise 
in terms of content as to establish direct effect. Under Article 226 EC 
the Commission’s acts or forbearance are without any legal signifi cance 
to legal and private persons.40 Thus, in comparison with the general in-
fringement procedure, this type of preventive measure is relatively more 
effective because of the far-reaching consequences of not complying with 
the procedure. 
C. Public Procurement/Pre-contractual Review 
In recognition of the time defi ciencies of the general infringement 
procedure and the procedure’s inadequacy as a guarantee of compli-
ance, Directive 89/665/EEC on the application of review procedures to 
the award of public supply and public works contracts, established a 
notifi cation procedure according to which the Commission can notify a 
Member State if it considers a contract to be unlawful. In its original 
proposal for a directive, the Commission proposed a provision according 
to which the Member States would be obliged to allow the Commission 
to intervene in the domestic administrative or judicial procedures con-
cerning public procurement. 41 The procedure, anticipated to strengthen 
enforcement by private litigants with a view to ‘ensur[ing] the precedence 
of Community public interest and compliance with the Community rules 
applicable to the award of public supply and public works contracts’, was 
not ultimately adopted. Instead, the ensuing procedure for the award of 
public contracts authorises the Commission to take interim measures 
aimed at suspending the implementation of unlawful decisions when it 
considers that a ‘clear and manifest infringement has been committed 
during a contract award procedure’.42 The decision must be taken prior 
to a contract being concluded. The Commission notifi es the Member State 
explaining its conclusion and the Member State must reply within 21 
days of receipt of notifi cation, confi rming that the infringement has been 
39  Case C-194/94 CIA Security International [1996] ECR I-2201 para 54 and summary.
40  See generally Alberto J Gil Ibáñez (n 1).
41  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive coordinating the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on procedures for 
the award of public supply and public works contracts’ COM (1987) 134 SYN 89.
42  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures 
to the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L395/33 preambular 
para 9.
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corrected or issue a reasoned submission as to why no correction has 
been made. As a last option, the Member State may issue a notice to the 
effect that the contract award procedure has been suspended. If a Mem-
ber State opts for the second scenario because judicial review is already 
taking place, it must keep the Commission informed of the result thereof 
when possible. The aim of ensuring enforcement is indisputable. Thus 
the Council explicitly motivates its act by stating that 
the existing arrangements at both national and Community levels 
for ensuring their [Community Directives on public procurement] 
application are not always adequate to ensure compliance with the 
relevant Community provisions particularly at a stage when infringe-
ments can be corrected.43 
At fi rst the measure appears to be a broadening of the Commission’s 
general enforcement powers. However, the procedure is a preliminary 
measure and should be seen in isolation of the general infringement pro-
cedure in spite of its functional aim of ensuring compliance by institution-
alising effective and rapid remedies in the case of infringements. The ECJ 
has clarifi ed the relationship between the procurement procedure and 
preventive measures in relation to the general infringement procedure. It 
emphasised that discretionary power to bring an action before the Court 
remains the exclusive Commission tool against committed infringements 
when it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfi l one of its Com-
munity obligations. The special procurement is ‘a preliminary measure 
which can neither derogate from nor replace the powers of the Commis-
sion under Article 169 [226 EC]’.44 Hence, the Court further notes, the 
general power to bring a Member State before the Court is unfettered.45 
In the White Paper on the Internal Market from 1985, the Commis-
sion listed preventive measures as one of the ways it intended to ‘carry 
out its duties of enforcing the rules’ and it continues to acclaim the in-
struments’ merits in the broader context of ensuring compliance.46 Pre-
ventive measures no doubt constitute a strong Commission tool per se 
and in conjunction with general enforcement powers should be taken into 
account when making a comprehensive depiction of the EC enforcement 
picture. It should at the same time be noted that corrective measures are 
no longer applied. According to the Commission this is due to the fact 
43  Ibid. 
44  Case C-359/93 Commission v Netherlands [1995] ECR I-157 para 13.
45  Ibid.
46  EC Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ (White Paper) COM (1985) 310; ‘Inter-
nal Market: Commission Presents Ten-Point Plan for Making Europe Better Off’ IP (2003) 
645, 7 May 2003; ‘European Governance’ (White Paper) COM (2001) 428, OJ C287.
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that they ‘suffer[ed] from several weaknesses (for instance the need for 
the Commission to make its decision before the contract is signed; and to 
show that the alleged infringement was “clear and manifest”)’.47 
There is now a range of sector-specifi c procurement procedures in-
cluding one on entities operating in the water, energy, transport and tel-
ecommunications sectors.48 Measures to anticipate compliance such as 
consultation, notifi cation and also prior consent are exceptionally inva-
sive. Thus, FL Kirgis remarks with reference to international law, ‘to the 
extent that formal procedural structures for prior consultation may be 
desirable, they should be tailored to recurring, relatively well-defi ned, 
troublesome situations’.49 Clearly, the EC Council members have not 
been willing to delegate strong powers to make corrective measures un-
conditionally. Thus they tie them in to certain Member State safeguards 
such as the condition that the Commission shall demonstrate that an 
infringement is clear and manifest. However by doing so these instru-
ments become cumbersome to utilise although they were intended to 
make up more easily and directly employable complements to the general 
Treaty infringement procedure. The Commission is of the view that pre-
contractual reviews can be made more effective and it recently issued a 
proposal for a directive in which the main components aimed at ensuring 
respect for the right to effective remedy and to a fair trial for private and 
legal persons.50 Given the administrative resources of the Commission, 
it has been unable to achieve comprehensive supervision of all contracts 
granted in the Member States under the public procurement Directives,51 
47  EC Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Report: Remedies in the Field of Public Procure-
ment’ (Commission Staff Working Document) SEC (2006) 557 (Annex to the ‘Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC CEE with regard to improving the effectiveness of review 
procedures concerning the award of public contracts’ COM (2006) 195).
48  Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the pro-
curement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommu-
nications sectors [1992] OJ L76/14.
49  Frederic L Kirgis, Prior Consultation in International Law (University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville 1983) 375. Cf JG Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (2nd edn Grotius 
Publications Ltd, Cambridge 1991) 3-4, who distinguishes between consultation, notifi ca-
tion and prior consent in international dispute settlement, the latter being ‘an extremely 
important power’. The author recognises that when ‘closer regulation is needed more com-
plex institutional arrangements may be appropriate’. 
50  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC CEE with regard to improv-
ing the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts’ COM 
(2006) 195 fi nal, preambular para 20.
51  Answer by Commissioner Monti on behalf of the Commission (23 October 1997) to Writ-
ten Question No 2722/97 by Jesús Cabezón Alonso to the Commission (Awarding of con-
tracts for projects co-fi nanced by the European Union) [1998] OJ C134/18. 
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and it is in this context that the Commission’s attempt to decentralise 
supervision by strengthening citizens’ remedies against infringements 
should be seen. 
2. Safeguard and emergency measures
Though the Court generally appraises Member State measures and 
their compatibility with Community law,52 there are exceptions and some 
of these relate to safeguard measures taken unilaterally by Member 
States. There is no all-encompassing design for these safeguard-clauses, 
however the standard type comprises two correlated provisions. One au-
thorises the Member State to take interim measures in derogation from 
a given harmonised requirement conditional on immediate notifi cation of 
the Commission. The other allows the Commission to apply the measures 
at the Community level by means of a committee procedure. At times a 
Member State will be required to withdraw a product from the market.53 
The special procedures, effective over a limited time period, are stipulat-
ed directly in Community primary law. Maintenance of public order and 
the safeguarding of internal security, the ECJ stresses, fall within the 
Member States’ exclusive competences which affects the margin of dis-
cretion enjoyed by the Member States.54 To prevent Member States from 
unilaterally introducing protectionist measures disguised as safeguard 
measures, the Commission has attained special powers of supervision. 
This right to monitor provisional measures includes powers to require 
modifi cations or changes of the measures.55 Similar instruments are es-
tablished concerning derogations from Common Market harmonisation 
measures56 and national security measures.57 
According to Article 152 EC, a high level of human health protection 
shall be ensured in the implementation of all Community policies and 
activities. The Council shall contribute to that objective through adopting 
52  Article 220 EC.
53  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-359/92 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 
I-3681, with reference to Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Internal Market following the Sin-
gle European Act’ (1987) 24 CML Rev 361, 398-399. See eg Article 9 of Council Directive 
92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general product safety. The provision enables the Commis-
sion to adopt a decision requiring Member States to take measures whereby the placing of 
a specifi c consumer product on the market is restricted or that product is withdrawn from 
the market.
54  Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 para 33.
55  European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market (Agnete Philipson), ‘Guide 
to the Concept and Practical Application of Articles 28-30 EC’ (January 2001) 23 <http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/art2830/guideart2830_en.pdf> accessed 
21 September 2007. 
56  Articles 95(4) - 95(9) EC.
57  Articles 296, 297 and 298 EC. 
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measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fi elds which have as their 
direct objective the protection of public health. There may be overriding 
considerations that call for rapid action against non-compliance in ad-
dition to the general interest in ensuring compliance. More recently, the 
food security rules have been strengthened substantially in favour of the 
Commission. In the motivation supplementing a 2002 legislative propos-
al, the Commission argued that the emergency measures it had tabled 
and which were eventually adopted by the Council and EP, would ‘allow 
effective action to be taken and avoid artifi cial disparities in the treatment 
of food representing a serious risk to human health’.58 The Commission 
maintained that severe food crises had revealed a need for crisis manage-
ment procedures. Growing concern resulted from a number of animal 
feed and food scares which took place in the 1990s, in particular, the 
Belgian crisis in 1999 concerning animal products contaminated with 
dioxin and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Under the 2002 regulation, 
the Commission, acting on its own-initiative or at the demand of a Mem-
ber State, can choose among a range of measures of varying intensity in 
accordance with the situation’s seriousness. The most rigorous action is 
suspension of the placing on the market or use of the food in question.59 
The measure is no doubt of an intrusive nature because the Member 
State is without infl uence on the Commission’s decision. However, the 
powers conferred upon the Commission are carefully counterbalanced 
by a supplementary clause which prescribes that the instrument chosen 
must be confi rmed, amended, revoked or extended within the framework 
of a regulatory committee.60 
The Commission readily admits that the measures are interchange-
able with Article 226 EC. Thus, in a later proposal for a regulation on 
Community safeguard measures concerning feed and food controls, the 
Commission reasons that the Treaty infraction procedure 
offers a tool for the Commission to proceed against Member States 
that fail to implement Community law. Although this procedure is a 
powerful instrument, the time constraints imposed render it imprac-
58  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the Eu-
ropean Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food’ COM (2000) 716 
preambular para 56.
59  Regulation No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the Eu-
ropean Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] 
OJ L31/1 art 53. The Regulation has a legal basis in Articles 37, 95, 133 and 152(4)(b) EC.
60  See Article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the pro-
cedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ 
L184/23. 
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tical where a failure to implement Community law requires prompt 
action to safeguard feed and food safety.61 (emphasis added)
In the particular case of dioxin contamination, the award of execu-
tive powers to the Commission has had considerable merits in terms of 
scaling-down the Commission’s action as Guardian of the Treaty under 
Article 226 EC ensuring the free movement of trade. Thus, in 1999 alone, 
the dioxin emergency triggered 100 cases under Article 226 EC.62 Pro-
ceedings were opened against Belgium, which was held responsible for 
failing, for months, to inform the Commission of contamination.63 Howev-
er the majority of cases concerned other Member States, which imposed 
unlawful trade restrictions against Belgium in response to its apparent 
non-compliance. 
3. Correction/conditionality
In addition to the Council’s own powers and those it may conse-
quently delegate according to Articles 202 and 211 EC, there are also 
executive powers that the EC Treaty attributes to the Commission.64 One 
such power concerns the EC budget. The question of delegation is not rel-
evant in those situations. According to Article 274 EC, the Commission 
shall implement the budget 
on its own responsibility and within the limits of the appropriations, 
having regard to the principles of sound fi nancial management. 
Member States shall cooperate with the Commission to ensure that 
the appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of 
sound fi nancial management. 
The Council is entitled to make adoption of decisions of individual 
application and with fi nancial effects subject to comitology. This right 
stems from Article 202 EC and, the Court asserts, does not infringe the 
61  EC Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on offi cial feed and food controls’ COM (2003) 52 preambular para 56. 
62  EC Commission, ‘17th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(1999)’ [2001] OJ C30/1.
63  The notifi cation obligation is stipulated in Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 Decem-
ber 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the com-
pletion of the internal market [1989] OJ L395/13 and Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 
June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community 
trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal 
market [1990] OJ L224/29.
64  Sabine Schlacke, ‘Centralization and Europeanization of Administrative Implementa-
tion: Product Safety Legislation’ in Mads Andenas and Alexander Türk (eds), Delegated Leg-
islation and the Role of Committees in the EC (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000), 
generally and p 304 especially. 
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Commission’s power under Article 274 EC to implement the budget on 
its own responsibility.65
According to Article 158 EC, the Community shall ‘develop and pur-
sue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion’ with a view ‘to promot[ing] its overall harmonious development’. 
The Community’s chief aim is to reduce ‘disparities between the levels of 
development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least fa-
voured regions or islands, including rural areas’.66 In the period 2000-06, 
the regional policies were allocated some 213 billion euros. 195 billion eu-
ros were assigned under the Structural Funds and 18 billion euros under 
the Cohesion Fund. Amounting to 35% of the Community budget, regional 
funds make up the second-largest item on the Community budget.67 
The autonomous powers of the Commission have been used to forge 
the Commission’s role in EU regional policy. Bausili, thus notes that the 
Commission, particularly owing to its institutional autonomy, has been 
the driving force behind the current system where funding relies on Com-
munity criteria.68 The development has resulted in ‘material expansion 
of competences, or to the development of new policy directions’,69 which 
effectively covers the fact that the Rome Treaty did not foresee the in-
ception of structural funds. In its administrative function managing EC 
resources and in particular the Community structural funds,70 the Com-
mission possesses implementing powers that bear some resemblance to 
actual enforcement powers. Signifi cantly, the processual arrangements 
include compliance assessments and the ensuing appraisals entail gen-
uine consequences such as the loss of privileges. In his treatment of 
sanctions imposed by the Community on national authorities, Hækkerup 
includes such arrangements because ‘the Community has chosen to use 
charges on Member States and deposits for payments as a substitute for 
true sanctions’.71 The ECJ has recognised that CAP Council can establish 
65  Case C-16/88 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457 para 18.
66  Article 158E EC.
67  See SCADPlus website, glossary entry for Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund <http://
europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/structural_cohesion_fund_en.htm> accessed 21 Septem-
ber 2007.
68  AV Bausili, ‘Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: Re-
forming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments’ (2002) Jean Monnet WP 9.
69  Ibid 3.
70  The European Regional Development Fund (Articles 177-181 EC), the European Social 
Fund (Articles 146-148 and 158-162 EC), the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) (Article 37 EC) and European Regional Development Fund (Article 161 EC, Articles 
163-173 EC).
71  Nick Hækkerup, Controls and Sanctions in the EU Law (DJOEF Publishing, Copenhagen 
2001).
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penalties to be imposed on individuals by the national authorities under 
Article 34(3) EC. Exclusions and the surcharges challenged may go be-
yond the mere refund of a benefi t improperly paid. The mechanism is not 
a mere correction tool, but has an additional enforcement purpose.72 It 
is different vis-à-vis Member States. Correction may effectively appear in-
terchangeable with the general Community infringement procedure from 
the states’ viewpoint. As an illustration, Greece maintained that a ‘cor-
rection may be regarded as a penalty’ in its interventions in C-332/01.73 
However, whereas penalties serve the purpose of ensuring compliance in 
line with the literal meaning of the word, namely to punish or to deter 
unlawful conduct with a view to bringing about compliance, conditional-
ity is different in its purpose and method. It is a substantive and formal 
management principle and its modus operandi for clearing accounts ‘serve 
to determine that the fi nancial burdens […] are correctly apportioned 
between the Member States and the Community’.74 The mechanism is 
foreseen to remedy unlawful expenditure and the correction is typically 
proportional to the scale of the infringement, ie the unlawful reception of 
aid. 
Some guidance on the effective difference between penalties and ad-
ministrative measures can be seen in Council Regulation 2988/95 on 
the protection of the European Communities’ fi nancial interests. In this 
regulation, the administrative measures are aimed at the ‘withdrawal 
of ... wrongly obtained advantage’ either by (re)payment of the received 
amount or total or partial loss of prepaid security. There is a correlation 
between the unlawfully obtained amount and the size of the administra-
tive fi ne. More exactly, the method of calculation entails that there is no 
sanctioning effect in the corrective measure.
The relationship between the Commission’s actions as an executive 
branch of government managing structural funds and in its function as 
Guardian of the Treaty has been clarifi ed by the ECJ. De jure, the pro-
cedures are not related and action undertaken under one is without rel-
evance for the other. In C-325/94 P An Taisce v Commission, An Taisce, 
The National Trust for Ireland, and the World Wide Fund for Nature UK, 
brought a case against the Commission seeking, fi rst, annulment of its 
decision not to suspend or withdraw the allocation of Community struc-
tural funds for fi nancing an interpretative centre for tourists in Mullagh-
more, Ireland and, secondly, not to initiate proceedings under Article 226 
72  Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383 para 29.
73  Case C-332/01 Greece v Commission [2004] ECR I-7699. See also Case C-247/98 Greece 
v Commission [2001] ECR I-1 paras 13 and 14. 
74  Case C-247/98 Hellenic Republic v Commission [2001] ECR I-1 para 13.
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EC for failure to live up to Community environmental standards.75 The 
applicants claimed that the Court of First Instance should annul both 
decisions. However, it is at the Commission’s discretion whether or not 
to initiate infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC. The remaining 
question was whether such a decision implicitly meant that the Commis-
sion also decided, at that time, not to make use of the possibility given 
it by Regulation No 4253/88 to suspend or reduce the use by the Irish 
authorities of Community funds. The Court of First Instance and, upon 
review, the ECJ rejected this interpretation.76 The Court ruled that the 
‘two procedures are independent of each other, serve different aims and 
are subject to different rules’77 as justifi cation for why a decision in the 
administrative phase of Article 226 EC is without prejudice to structural 
funds. The Commission has subsequently decided that although politi-
cally and legally independent of each other ‘there must be some degree 
of consistency between the two [procedures]’.78 In practice this has come 
to mean that the Commission as a rule suspends grant payments when 
it issues a letter of formal notice. When a reasoned opinion is issued, the 
Commission will initiate a process to reduce or withdraw funding.79 The 
Commission nonetheless emphasises that the jurisprudence does not 
imply that the procedures are mutually exclusive and therefore it retains 
full discretion under these procedures.80 Decisions concerning structural 
funding are binding and the Member States have appeal to the ECJ un-
der Article 230 EC.
The political nature of the Commission’s function under EC enforce-
ment procedure is refl ected in the Commission decision-making process. 
Thus, although the different Directorate Generals’ (DG) work independ-
ently in the administrative phases of Article 226 EC, it is the Commis-
sion as a college that decides on recourse to the ECJ.81 In matters of 
supervision of revenue and expenditure, the decision-making power can 
75  Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of cer-
tain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L175/40 and Council Direc-
tive 80/68/EEC of 17 December 1979 on the protection of groundwater against pollution 
caused by certain dangerous substances [1980] OJ L20/43.
76  Case T-461/93 An Taisce v Commission [1994] II-733 para 38 and Case C-325/94 P An 
Taisce v Commission [1996] ECR I-3727 para 37.
77  Case C-325/94 P (n 76) summary.
78  EC Commission, ‘16th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(1998)’ [1999] OJ C354/1. 
79  EC Commission, ‘17th Annual Report’ (n 62).
80  EC Commission, ‘15th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(1997)’ [1998] OJ C250.
81  Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449 para 34.
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be delegated to the relevant DG. 82 It thus takes the form of an admin-
istrative decision and the political dimension is as a result signifi cantly 
down-played. This is in part because the Commission is obliged under 
Article 280, para 1 to retrieve unlawful payments, ‘whether by error, ir-
regularity or deliberate fraud’.83 Surely it makes a difference that condi-
tionality for subsidies for the most is based on premises that are fairly 
concrete although the Commission may enjoy some discretion in deter-
mining whether they have been met. Such executive decision making 
is fundamentally different from the semi-political choices made by the 
Commission under the infringement procedure. The College, naturally, 
retains collective responsibility.84 However, the concrete responsibility for 
implementation varies, and the ‘authorising offi cer delegate’ will often be 
the Director Generals or Heads of Service.85 
The political trait of the general Community infringement procedure, 
as is apparent from the margin of discretion attributed to the Commis-
sion, does not necessarily apply to the legal framework of the structural 
funds. Instead, the Commission may be obliged to undertake fi nancial 
correction where the conditions for funding have not been observed.86 
Whether a correction will take place may rest on a culpability criterion 
whereas the general infringement procedure is of a neutral nature even 
in relation to the imposition of sanctions under Article 228 EC.87 Where 
there is a margin of discretion, the Commission will make an assessment 
of the region affected and ensure that poor regions are not disproportion-
ately harmed and that any development process will not be compromised 
unnecessarily.88 
To recap, the legislator may make entitlement to resources condi-
tional upon compliance with Community law. Moreover, implementing 
the system is within the Commission’s executive and not its supervisory 
82  Commission Decision 74/55/EEC of 22 January 1974 conferring powers to carry out 
measures of control in Member States in respect of Community revenue and expenditure 
[1974] OJ L34/28. 
83  EC Commission, ‘Implementation of the European Union’s Budget’ MEMO (2005) 421, 
14 November 2005. 
84  See Rules of Procedure of the European Commission [2000] OJ L308/26 art 13 and 
14.
85  See EC Commission, ‘Implementation of the European Union’s Budget’ (n 83).
86  Case C-332/01 Greece v Commission [2004] ECR I-7699 para 63. 
87  See eg Regulation No 1655/1999 laying down general rules for the granting of Commu-
nity aid in the fi eld of trans-European networks [1999] OJ L197/1: ‘Except where the Mem-
ber States and/or the implementing authority provide proof that they were not responsible 
for the irregularity, the Member State shall be liable in the alternative for reimbursement of 
any sums unduly paid.’ In comparison, the ECJ has consistently held that internal circum-
stances cannot constitute a mitigating effect when ruling on compliance under the general 
infringement procedure. 
88  EC Commission, ‘16th Annual Report’ (n 78).
